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IDENTITY CRISIS: THE MISCLASSIFICATION
OF CALIFORNIA UBER DRIVERS
Benjamin Powell
The Uber ridesharing service is synonymous with the rise of mobile
application-based services. This business model has spurred a number
of novel legal questions, particularly surrounding the proper
identification of Uber drivers. Are they employees, guaranteed the ample
protections and workers' rights under California law? Or independent
contractors, less subject to employer control, but without the same
protections the State provides to employees? With the proliferation of
these types of services, answering this question is of critical importance,
both to current Uber drivers as well as the countless others who will enter
this rapidly-developing field in the coming years. This Article provides
an answer to that question by applying longstanding California
employment law to the Uber model with the aim of properly and
accurately characterizing its drivers as legally-recognized employees.

 J.D., 2016, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. A special thanks to Samuel Donohue for
ensuring that this article reached publication, and to Dean Michael Waterstone for guidance as my
Professor Sponsor. A final thank you to Ariana and Nala for ensuring I had the support system
necessary to bring this idea to fruition.
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I. INTRODUCTION
San Francisco-based Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”) has
become synonymous with the ridesharing phenomenon that has swept
the globe in recent years. Uber has turned the taxi industry on its head,
and catalyzed the growth of an entirely new subset of the technology
industry by pioneering the idea of using a mobile application to
“broker” services between consumers and providers.
Uber operates by providing a digital platform that connects
passengers with independent drivers in real-time through an
application accessed from a mobile device.1 The application allows a
potential passenger to view a car’s location, the driver’s photograph,
and customer ratings before choosing whether to accept a driver’s
offer for a ride.2 Passengers pay for the service and receive receipts
through interfacing with Uber’s mobile application.3
The “independent contractor” is instrumental to Uber’s business
model. By classifying its drivers as independent business entities, and
not treating them as “employees,” Uber is exempted from providing
them with certain benefits afforded to workers classified as
“employees,” including minimum wage and overtime.4 The practice
of classifying workers as independent contractors is common, and has
led to accusations that some businesses purposely misclassify their
employees as independent contractors in order to avoid the costs
associated with maintaining an employer-employee relationship.5

1. Catherine Lee Rassman, STAFF ARTICLE SERIES: Regulating Rideshare Without Stifling
Innovation: Examining the Drivers, the Insurance “Gap,” and Why Pennsylvania Should Get on
Board, 15 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 81, 83 (2014).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Independent contractor versus employee, ST. OF CAL. DEP’T OF INDUS. REL.,
http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/faq_independentcontractor.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2015). The list of
employer benefits is extensive: “Employers using independent contractors also do not have to pay
payroll taxes, comply with other wage and hour law requirements such as providing meal periods
and rest breaks, or reimburse their workers for business expenses incurred in performing their jobs.
Additionally, employers do not have to cover independent contractors under workers’
compensation insurance, and are not liable for payments under unemployment insurance, disability
insurance, or social security.” Id.
5. See Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When it Sees One and
How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 337 (2001) (“The costs of
payroll taxes, the administrative costs and liabilities of wage and benefits laws, the risks of
employment discrimination law, the obligation to bargain with unions, the burden of providing
family or medical leave, and the general uncertainty that many employers feel with respect to the
law, are reason enough for many employers to consider loosening a few strings in order to convert
employees to independent contractor status.”).
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Opponents of Uber’s business model argue that companies like
Uber (and rival Lyft) are essentially providing “passenger for hire”
services, and thus, should be subjected to the same regulations that
more traditional providers (e.g., taxi companies) are required to
comply with.6 Uber, on the other hand, contends that its service is
distinct from traditional “taxi-style” models, and merely provides “a
digital marketplace that connects voluntary consumers with voluntary
drivers, who . . . are independent contractors driving their own cars
and setting their own schedules.”7
Whether or not Uber is properly classifying its drivers has
become a contentious point. Several California Uber drivers have
successfully contested their statuses as independent contractors in
administrative contexts, in front of both the California Labor
Commissioner’s Office and the California Employment Development
Department (“EDD”).8 Additionally, a class composed of all Uber
drivers who operate in California has filed a federal lawsuit against the
ride-for-hire company in a case currently being heard in San
Francisco.
The parties’ arguments in both of these contexts boil down
similarly. Drivers claim that their job duties entitle them as a matter of
law to classification as employees,9 while Uber contends essentially
that due to the ostensibly hands-off approach it uses to manage its
drivers, they are classified properly as independent contractors.10
However the dust settles around this issue, the fate of the
California Uber driver has significant implications not only for the
thousands driving for the company in the state and across the nation
(and, for that matter, around the world), but for any would-be

6. Rassman, supra note 1, at 83 (“Whereas taxis require a permit, inspection, maintenance,
insurance, and their drivers screened and trained, critics scoff that rideshare drivers need only a car,
some gas, a smartphone, and a bank account.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Berwick, 80 Cal. Comp. Cases 936 (Cal. Labor Comm’r June 3, 2015) (finding
that an Uber driver was misclassified as an independent contractor), and Decision, LICHTEN &
LISS-RIORDAN, P.C. (June 6, 2015), http://uberlawsui t.com/Uber%20Case %20No.%205
371509.pdf (finding an Uber driver to be an employee for purposes of unemployment benefits).
9. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(“Plaintiffs claim that they are employees of Uber, as opposed to its independent contractors, and
thus are eligible for various statutory protections codified in the California Labor Code.”).
10. Id. at 1137 (“Uber argues the drivers are not its employees but instead are independent
contractors, and therefore not entitled to the protection of the California Labor Code as asserted
herein.”).
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entrepreneurs seeking to capitalize on the newest tech-based business
model as well.
While there is certainly merit on both sides of the debate
surrounding proper classification of Uber drivers, the extensive body
of California law that has developed in this realm may provide a
definitive answer. Based on the applicable rules, tests, and case law
that have developed in California over the last several generations,
Uber drivers are most properly classified as employees, entitled to all
of the attendant benefits associated with such a title.
Part II of this Article will discuss California law as it has built on
this subject. Part III applies this law to Uber’s business model and
explains the conclusion introduced above. Finally, Part IV considers
the prudential value of classifying Uber drivers as employees and
attempts to place the decision in context.
II. EMPLOYMENT CLASSIFICATION LAW
Independent contractor law in California has quite an extensive
history, stretching back at least to the 1940s.11 While there were
several important cases in the intervening period between then and the
1980s, the California Supreme Court consolidated this body of law
and announced the now-current framework for employment
classification in 1989 with its decision in S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v.
Department of Industrial Relations.12
A. The Borello Framework
Borello is the seminal case for determining employment
classifications in California.13 There, the court was asked to determine
whether agricultural laborers engaged to harvest cucumbers under a
written “sharefarmer” agreement were “independent contractors”
exempt from workers’ compensation coverage.14 The grower in the
operation claimed the “sharefarmer” harvesters were independent
contractors because they “manage[d] their own labor, share[d] the
profit or loss from the crop, and agree[d] in writing that they [were]
not employees.”15
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See, e.g., Empire Star Mines Co. v. Cal. Emp’t Comm’n, 168 P.2d 686 (Cal. 1946).
769 P.2d 399 (1989).
Lara v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 769, 779 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
Borello, 769 P.2d at 400.
Id.
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In tackling the question, the Borello court extensively discussed
the body of cases that make up employment classification law in
California,16 settling eventually on what is essentially a two-part
inquiry for determining worker status: (1) the primary “right to
control” test, and (2) consideration of several secondary factors.17
First, the court looks at the degree of control the alleged employer
maintains over the person doing the work.18 The court explained this
“control of details” test first arose at common law in the context of
limiting one’s vicarious liability for the misconduct of a person
rendering services to him.19 The right to control work details was thus
particularly important because “the extent to which the employer had
a right to control activities was . . . highly relevant to the question
whether the employer ought to be legally liable for [the
misconduct].”20
The second element rises out of a concern that the right to control
work details, while being the “most important” or “most significant”
consideration, is inherently limited in evaluating “the infinite variety
of service arrangements.”21 The Borello court therefore opted to
endorse a number of “secondary indicia” of the nature of a service
relationship in order to aid the inquiry.22 These secondary factors
include:
(a) Whether the one performing services is engaged in a
distinct occupation or business;
(b) The kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the
principal or by a specialist without supervision;
(c) The skill required in the particular occupation;
16. See generally Id. at 403–07 (The Borello court considered cases from as early as 1946 in
order to synthesize what would become Borello’s two-part test, including Empire Star Mines Co.
v. Cal. Emp’t Comm’n, 168 P.2d 686 (1946), Perguica v. Indus. Acc. Comm’n, 179 P.2d 812 (1947),
Isenberg v. Cal. Emp. Stabilization. Comm’n, 180 P.2d 11 (1947), Tieberg v. Unemployment Ins.
Appeals Bd., 471 P.2d 975 (1970), Laeng v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., 494 P.2d 1 (1972),
Kowalski v. Shell Oil Co., 588 P.2d 811 (1979), and Germann v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 176
Cal. Rptr. 868 (1981)).
17. Borello, 769 P.2d at 403–04.
18. Id. at 403.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 404.
22. Id. The Borello opinion would seem to indicate that “the right to discharge at will, without
cause” is also a secondary factor to be considered along with the others, but later cases have more
often interpreted this factor largely as informing the primary “right to control” analysis instead.
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(d) Whether the principal or the worker supplies the
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person
doing the work;
(e) The length of time for which the services are to be
performed;
(f) The method of payment, whether by the time or by the
job;
(g) Whether or not the work is a part of the regular business
of the principal; and
(h) Whether or not the parties believe they are creating the
relationship of employer-employee.23
Applying this newly expounded framework to the facts at hand,
the Borello court found the grower’s arguments unpersuasive.24 With
regard to the “right to control” test, the court held that because Borello,
the employer, controlled “all meaningful aspects” of the business
relationship (price, crop cultivation, fertilization and insect
prevention, payment, and right to deal with buyers), it thereby retained
all necessary control over the harvest portion of its operations.25
The court then applied the secondary multi-factor criteria
described above, finding that a number of the factors were indicative
of an employment relationship. It focused on the harvesters’ roles as
“regular and integrated portion[s]” of Borello’s business operation and
the permanence of the relationship between Borello and the individual
harvesters.26 It also briefly addressed several of the other factors:

23. Id. The Borello court also noted a six-factor test developed by other jurisdictions for
determining independent contractor status, which includes the following factors (some of which
overlap with those listed above): (1) the “right to control the work”; (2) the alleged employee’s
opportunity for profit or loss depending on his managerial skill; (3) the alleged employee’s
investment in equipment or materials required for his task, or his employment of helpers; (4)
whether the service rendered requires a special skill; (5) the degree of permanence of the working
relationship, and; (6) whether the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer’s
business. Id. at 407. In the few cases that actually cite to these factors, their analysis and application
are largely folded into the inquiry regarding the main secondary factors listed above. See, e.g.,
Gonzales v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 308, 313–14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); see
also Johnson v. Berkofsky-Barret Prods., 260 Cal. Rptr. 67, 70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). These
additional factors are rarely given any independent analysis, and, in some instances, are relegated
to a footnote. See, e.g., Air Couriers Int’l v. Emp’t Dev. Dep’t, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37, 44 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2007). Thus, they are accorded the same treatment here.
24. Borello, 769 P.2d at 400–01.
25. Id. at 408.
26. Id. at 408.
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[T]he sharefarmers and their families exhibit no
characteristics which might place them outside [Worker’s
Compensation coverage]. They engage in no distinct trade or
calling. They do not hold themselves out in business . . .
They invest nothing but personal service and hand tools.
They incur no opportunity for ‘profit’ or ‘loss’; like
employees hired on a piecework basis, they are simply paid
by the size and grade of cucumbers they pick.27
The court, concerned that a finding of independent contractor
status for the sharefarmers would “suggest a disturbing means of
avoiding an employer’s obligations under . . . California [law],” held
that Borello failed to demonstrate that the sharefarmers were
independent contractors.28
B. Borello Applied
Since Borello, California courts have applied the above
framework a number of times. These cases refine and clarify the scope
and application of both the “right to control” test and the secondary
factors propounded by the California Supreme Court.
1. The Right to Control
In applying the “right to control” test, courts have emphasized
that the salient inquiry is “whether the hirer ‘retains all necessary
control’ over its operations.”29 Further, “what matters under the
common law is not how much control a hirer exercises, but how much
control the hirer retains the right to exercise.”30 This has resulted in
findings of employment relationships both when an employer remains
intricately involved in the details of the work and when the employer
maintains some distance between himself and his workers.
In Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp.,31 the Ninth Circuit, applying
California law, found a group of drivers who worked for a logistics
corporation were employees because the company retained “absolute
control over drivers’ rates, payment, routes, schedules, trucks,
equipment, appearance, decision to hire helpers, choice of helpers, and
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 409.
Id. at 410.
See Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 327 P.3d 165, 171 (Cal. 2014).
Id. at 172 (citing Perguica v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 179 P.2d 812, 813 (Cal. 1947)).
754 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2014).
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the right to deal with customers.”32 The court held these circumstances
were more than sufficient to establish that the employer retained all
“necessary control.”33
On the other hand, courts have not hesitated to find employment
relationships even when a putative employer utilizes a more hands-off
approach. In another case involving drivers, JKH Enterprises, Inc. v.
Department of Industrial Relations,34 the California Court of Appeal
found an employer-employee relationship between a courier company
and its couriers despite both the company’s lack of control over the
details of the work and its being more concerned with results rather
than means of accomplishment: “By obtaining the clients in need of
the service and providing the workers to conduct it, JKH retained all
necessary control over the operation as a whole.”35
Similarly, in Yellow Cab Coop. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals
Board,36 the California Court of Appeal rejected a taxi company’s
claim that it was only concerned with the result of the work conducted
by its drivers.37 The court held that “[i]f Yellow [Cab] were only
contracting for the ‘particular result’ . . . it would be concerned with
little more than collecting rent and protecting the leased property.
Instead, it had an obvious interest in the drivers’ performance as
drivers. To protect that interest, it treated them as employees.”38
In State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Brown,39 however, the California
Court of Appeal returned the opposite result, finding a group of truck
drivers to be properly classified as independent contractors in part
because the employer’s “participation [was] limited to offering the
assignments and paying compensation upon proof of delivery.”40
In addition, courts have placed particular weight on whether an
alleged employer retains the right to terminate a worker without cause
as an indicator of the right to control.41 As the California Supreme

32. Id. at 1103.
33. Id.
34. 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
35. Id. at 579.
36. 277 Cal. Rptr. 434 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
37. See id. at 441.
38. Id. (emphasis in original).
39. 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
40. Id. at 105.
41. See, e.g., Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 327 P.3d 165, 172 (Cal. 2014)
(“Whether a right of control exists may be measured by asking whether or not, if instructions were
given, they would have to be obeyed on pain of at-will discharge for disobedience.”) (internal
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Court has explained, “the power of the principal to terminate the
services of the agent gives him the means of controlling the agent’s
activities.”42 In Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court,43
the court found employment status for a pizza delivery driver where
the employer retained the express contractual right to terminate the
relationship: “Perhaps no single circumstance is more conclusive to
show the relationship of an employee than the right of the employer to
end the service whenever he sees fit to do so.”44
These cases demonstrate an important point: an employment
relationship can be found regardless of the control actually exercised
by the employer. As long as he retains the ability to control the details
of the work, courts remain satisfied that the right to control has been
established; it is not a requirement that the employer micromanage
every aspect of the job’s duties. The natural conclusion from this point
is that the “right to control” test is largely fact-determinative, and its
result depends on the totality of the circumstances in conjunction with
the secondary factors.45
2. Secondary Indicia
While it is true that both the “right to control” test and the
secondary factors are perhaps best understood when taken together, it
is important to remember the secondary Borello factors are just that:
secondary. Thus, they should be weighed as such, with a healthy
deference to the right to control.
Additionally, as with the “right to control” test, application of the
secondary factors is fluid and circumstantial. “These factors ‘generally
. . . cannot be applied mechanically as separate tests; they are
intertwined, and their weight depends often on particular

quotation marks omitted) (citing Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court, 269 Cal. Rptr.
647, 653 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
42. Ayala, 327 P.3d at 171 (citing Malloy v. Fong, 232 P.2d 241, 249 (Cal. 1951)). Indeed,
the significance of the right to terminate without cause far predates Borello; a testament to its
relative weight in the analysis.
43. 269 Cal. Rptr. 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
44. See id. at 653–54 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Yellow Cab Coop. v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 277 Cal. Rptr. 434, 442 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (employment status
found in part due to the conclusion that “indirect control was effected through . . . the threat of
termination.”).
45. See Ayala, 327 P.3d at 177 (“[T]he significance of any one factor and its role in the overall
calculus may vary from case to case depending on the nature of the work and the evidence.”).
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combinations.’”46 Proceeding with the above in mind, the cases
following Borello elaborate on the meaning and analysis of each of the
secondary factors.
a. Distinct occupation or business
A worker’s engagement in a distinct occupation or business
suggests that the worker is an independent contractor.47 Borello itself
noted that the sharefarmers “engage[d] in no distinct trade or calling”
and “d[id] not hold themselves out in business.”48 A number of other
cases have agreed with this sentiment, finding employment status
when workers were not operating an independent business apart from
that of the alleged employer.
In Antelope Valley Press v. Poizner,49 the court found
employment status for newspaper deliverers where there was no
evidence that any of them held themselves out as being part of an
independent delivery service.50 Similarly, in Air Couriers
International v. Employment Develop Department,51 the Court of
Appeal upheld a trial court’s determination that a group of couriers,
working for a courier company, were employees, and not “engaged in
a separate profession or operating an independent business.”52
b. Supervision
For obvious reasons, this factor is closely tied to the “right to
control” test, as close supervision is clearly indicative of an
employer’s ability to control the details of the work. Consequently,
increased supervision points to classification as an employee.53 What
the cases make clear, however, is that the existence of a certain amount
of freedom in a particular position does not necessarily cut in favor of
an independent contractor classification.54 Rather, to repeat the
46. Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing S.G.
Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989)).
47. Harris v. Vector Mktg. Corp., 656 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1138–39 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
48. Borello, 769 P.2d at 409.
49. 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 887 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
50. Id. at 892–93.
51. 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
52. Id. at 47.
53. Malloy v. Fong, 232 P.2d 241, 249 (Cal. 1951) (“The existence of the right of control and
supervision establishes the existence of an agency relationship.”).
54. Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 327 P.3d 165, 171 (Cal. 2014) (“[T]he fact
that a certain amount of freedom of action is inherent in the nature of the work does not change the
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refrain, what matters is whether the hirer retains “necessary control”
over the worker’s actions.55
c. Required skill
Where no special skill is required of a worker, that fact supports
a conclusion that the worker is an independent contractor.56
Consideration of this factor is also tied to application of both the “right
to control” test and the “supervision” factor above. Courts have found
that when a particular job does not require a specialized set of skills,
in-depth control of work details is not strictly necessary; this apparent
lack of control, then, does not necessarily favor independent
contractor status as long as, again, “necessary control” is maintained.57
Factually, courts have been particularly unsympathetic to the idea that
any type of courier or delivery position requires an inordinately high
level of skill, finding employment status for cab drivers,58 newspaper
deliverers,59 and delivery truck drivers.60

character of the employment where the employer has general supervision and control over it.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
55. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp., 754 F.3d 1093, 1104 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding
employee status where a company “closely supervised the drivers’ work through various methods,”
which pointed to them working under the principal’s direction).
56. Harris v. Vector Mktg. Corp., 656 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1139 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
57. Air Couriers Int’l v. Emp’t Dev. Dep’t., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37, 46 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“The
[trial] court noted that the simplicity of the work (take this package from point A to point B) made
detailed supervision, or control, unnecessary. Instead, [the employer] retained all necessary control
over the overall delivery operation.”).
58. Yellow Cab Coop. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 277 Cal. Rptr. 434, 441 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (“The work did not involve the kind of expertise which requires entrustment to an
independent professional . . . and the skill required on the job is such that it can be done by
employees rather than specially skilled independent workmen.”).
59. Antelope Valley Press v. Poizner, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 887, 900 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)
(“Delivering papers requires no particular skill.”).
60. See JKH Enters., Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 563, 579 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006) (“[T]he functions performed by the drivers, pickup and delivery of papers or packages and
driving in between, did not require a high degree of skill.”); see also Alexander v. FedEx Ground
Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 995 (9th Cir. 2014) (“FedEx drivers need no experience to get the job
in the first place and [the] only required skill is the ability to drive.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted). But see State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Brown, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 98, 105 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)
(finding independent contractor status for truck drivers: “[T]ruck driving—while perhaps not a
skilled craft—requires abilities beyond those possessed by a general laborer (or, indeed, possessors
of ordinary driver’s licenses), and the manner in which the services are provided require a greater
exercise of the driver’s discretion . . . .”).
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d. Instrumentalities, tools, and place of work
When an alleged employer provides the “instrumentalities, tools,
and place of work” for the worker, courts have been more inclined to
find employee status.61 Relevantly, in many of the cases involving
drivers of various types, courts have found employee status despite the
fact that a driver might provide his own vehicle in order to complete
the work.62
e. Length of time
Where a worker is employed for a lengthy period of time, the
relationship with the employer looks more like an employer-employee
relationship.63 Analysis of this factor generally focuses on two points:
whether the job is one in which workers generally remain employed
for extended periods of time,64 and whether at the time the relationship
is entered into, there is a contemplated end point.65
f. Method of payment
In general, hourly payment formats favor employee status, while
per-job payment favors independent contractor status.66 However,
when other evidence leans toward a finding of employee status, courts
have not allowed a per-job payment system to change the result.67
61. Alexander, 765 F.3d at 995 (citing Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp., 754 F.3d 1093, 1104
(9th Cir. 2014) as holding that, where “Affinity supplied the drivers with the major tools of the job
by encouraging or requiring that the drivers obtain the tools from them through paid leasing
arrangements, this factor favored employee status.”).
62. Air Couriers, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 47 (“[A]ll [the employer] required of a driver was a
vehicle and automobile insurance; drivers did not make any major investments in equipment or
materials.”). But see Alexander, 765 F.3d at 995 (finding employment status for FedEx drivers even
while conceding that the fact that drivers provide their own vehicles and are not required to get
other equipment from FedEx “slightly favors” independent contractor status).
63. Harris v. Vector Mktg. Corp., 656 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1140 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
64. See, e.g., Ruiz, 754 F.3d at 1105 (“[T]here was no end to the service relationship when
Affinity and the drivers signed their contracts, and drivers often stayed with Affinity for years.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Air Couriers, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 47 (“[M]any of the
drivers delivered for Sonic for years. At trial, the drivers testified to lengthy tenures with Sonic,
another factor inconsistent with independent contractor status.”).
65. See, e.g., Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2010) (“This was not a
circumstance where a contractor was hired to perform a specific task for a defined period of time.
There was no contemplated end to the service relationship at the time that the plaintiff [d]rivers
began working for [FedEx].”).
66. Alexander, 765 F.3d at 996.
67. See Ruiz, 754 F.3d at 1105 (holding that even though drivers were paid by the delivery,
findings that drivers made approximately eight deliveries per day and the amount paid to each
driver “essentially remained the same” led to the conclusion that the drivers were essentially paid
by a regular rate of pay); see also Alexander, 765 F.3d at 996 (“Where . . . there is ample

50.3 POWELL (DO NOT DELETE)

472

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

10/23/2018 4:16 PM

[Vol. 50:459

g. Part of the regular business
When workers are found to be part of the regular business of the
employer, this factor favors employee status.68 In applying this factor,
courts have focused largely on the indispensability of the workers to
the hirer’s business, and have tended to find employee status when a
worker’s duties are essential to the operation as a whole.69
Thus, in Ruiz, the Ninth Circuit found employee status for home
delivery drivers when the “drivers perform[ed] those home delivery
services that are the core of [the company’s] regular business,”
because “[w]ithout drivers, [the company] could not be in the home
delivery business.”70
h. Parties’ beliefs
As with the “method of payment” factor above, the parties’
beliefs about whether a worker is an employee or an independent
contractor are relevant, but will be ignored if their conduct establishes
otherwise.71 This is true even when (or perhaps especially when) there
exists a written agreement that the worker will be classified as an
independent contractor.72
Armed with the exegesis of law in this area by California courts
over the last several decades, application of these concepts to Uber
drivers provides the solution as to their proper classification.
III. APPLICATION TO UBER
While there are obviously novel aspects to Uber’s business model
that aren’t precisely encapsulated by the law outlined above, the law
is sufficiently broad for Uber’s core tenets and policies to fall
sufficiently within its purview.
independent evidence that the employer has the right to control the actual details of the employee’s
work . . . , the fact that . . . the employee is paid by the job rather than by the hour appears to be of
minute consequence.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
68. S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 408 (Cal. 1989).
69. Air Couriers Int’l. v. Emp’t Dev. Dep’t., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37, 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)
(finding that where the company set rates, billed customers, and collected payment, drivers’
deliveries were “integral,” “essential,” and “part of [the company’s] regular business”).
70. Ruiz, 754 F.3d at 1105.
71. Id. (“As the California Court of Appeal has noted . . . “the parties’ label is not dispositive
and will be ignored if their actual conduct establishes a different relationship.”) (citing Estrada v.
FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, 336 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)).
72. Alexander, 765 F.3d at 996 (finding that while the contract at issue identified the driver as
an independent contractor, “[u]ltimately . . . neither [FedEx]’s nor the drivers’ own perception of
their relationship . . . is dispositive.”).
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A. Uber’s Right to Control
As has been made abundantly clear by the case law outlined
above, the “right to control” aspect of an employment configuration is
the most important consideration. As the circumstances surrounding
Uber’s business model and, more specifically, the interactions
between Uber and its drivers demonstrate, Uber does indeed exercise
“all necessary control” over its drivers’ activities.
Beginning with the hiring stage, it would be difficult to argue that
Uber does not exercise substantial control over the work details of its
drivers. In order to drive for Uber, applicants must undergo a fairly
involved application and screening process. This includes being
required to upload driver’s license and vehicle information, passing a
background check, attending a traditional interview with an Uber
employee, and passing a “city knowledge test.”73 Only after an
applicant completes these steps and signs a contract with Uber
(discussed below) is he or she able to begin driving for the company.
Once approved to join Uber’s ranks, a driver is free to perform
his duties as he wishes—to an extent. On one hand, Uber drivers
technically have the freedom to sign in to Uber’s mobile application
as rarely or as often as they like, subject only to minimally restrictive
contractual provisions.74 Additionally, once a driver picks up a
passenger, he is free to complete the route in any appropriate manner.75
However, it should be noted that drivers have no input whatsoever in
setting fares—Uber does this on a unilateral basis.76
On the other hand, and on a more practical level, Uber drivers are
expected to abide by certain regulations and standards during their
interactions with passengers. For instance, Uber expects that its
drivers will accept all ride requests it receives,77 despite the language
included in the contracts drivers are required to sign.78
Uber also instructs its drivers to comply with numerous other
detail-oriented requirements. These include “dressing professionally,”
73. O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
74. Id. at 1149 (“Uber further claims that the right to control element is not met because drivers
can work as much or as little as they like, as long as they give at least one ride every 180 days (if
on the uberX platform) or every 30 days (if on the uberBlack platform).”).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1142.
77. Id. at 1149. Supplemental literature provided by Uber provides that it expects drivers not
to reject ride requests, notwithstanding contractual language to the contrary (see below).
78. Exhibit 223-15 at 3, O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(No. C-13-3826 EMC) (“You shall have no obligation to the Company to accept any request.”).
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sending passengers text messages when 1–2 minutes from the pickup
location, tuning the car’s radio to specific stations, opening doors for
passengers, and ensuring that drivers’ cars are equipped with
umbrellas in case of rain.79
Further evidence of Uber’s right to control its drivers’ work
details comes in the form of its processes for evaluating and measuring
driver performance. Uber closely monitors various aspects of its
drivers’ activities, including the rate and frequency at which drivers
accept, reject, and cancel potential passengers, how consistently
drivers arrive on time, and the quality of drivers’ vehicles.80
Uber also utilizes a rating system, whereby passengers have the
ability to rate their driver’s services (from one to five stars), and
drivers in turn are able to rate their passengers.81
Uber then uses these metrics to evaluate its drivers. Based on a
driver’s performance in these areas, Uber reserves the right to
deactivate the accounts of (i.e., terminate) drivers who fall below
certain “quality standards.”82 Specifically, Uber documents suggest
that the company will “follow up on every quality issue,” and driver
contracts provide that Uber may terminate any driver whose star rating
falls below a specified level.83 In order to prevent drivers from falling
below these levels, Uber periodically sends “suggestions” to at-risk
drivers about how to improve their ratings, including further
recommendations on attire, surpassing arrival time expectations, and
other rather specific suggestions such as providing bottled water for
passengers.84
In analyzing the above information in light of California law, it is
worth reiterating several points. First, and most specifically, these
aspects of Uber’s business model are particularly relevant in light of
79. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1149–50. At least in the context of the O’Connor litigation,
Uber contends that these requirements are merely “suggestions.” Id. at 1150. Uber’s efforts to
enforce these rules, however (discussed below), indicate otherwise.
80. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion for Summary
Judgment at 4:5–7, O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. CV
13-3826-EMC).
81. Notice of Motion and Motion of Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. for Summary
Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 4:11–12, O’Connor v.
Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 13-03826-EMC).
82. Id. at 4:13–15.
83. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1151.
84. Notice of Motion and Motion of Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. for Summary
Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 4:15–19, O’Connor, 82
F. Supp. 3d 1133 (No. 13-03826-EMC).
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the observation in Part II that the right to terminate at will is a weighty
indicator of employee status.85 Additionally, and more generally, the
most important considerations here are (1) that there is a critical
difference between the level of control actually exercised by an
alleged employer and the level of control an employer retains the right
to exercise,86 and (2) that in order to satisfy this element of the Borello
framework, an employer must only exercise “necessary” control over
its putative employees.87
Guided by these considerations, and returning to the realities of
driving for Uber, it is clear that the company does indeed exercise
considerable control over its drivers; control that, at the very least,
rises to a level that satisfies threshold requirements of California law.
Beginning with the right to terminate, this element cuts sharply in
favor of satisfying the “right to control” test. The evaluation methods
discussed above result essentially in a de facto “right to terminate,”
and Uber’s ability to unilaterally suspend or deactivate drivers’
accounts, readily apparent from its contracts with drivers and its
supporting literature, is highly indicative of a more explicit right to
terminate at will.88
Setting aside the right to terminate, the remaining factual
circumstances also indicate substantial control over work details. To
be sure, Uber drivers do enjoy a level of freedom in their work that is
arguably uncommon under a traditional employment relationship.
Based on this alone, Uber has a colorable argument that it is primarily
interested in the results of the work as opposed to the details of the
actual transportation process. In reality, however, Uber’s efforts to
manage many of the details of the job belie such a conclusion.
Far from remaining disinterested, Uber has its hand in every step
of the process. It would be disingenuous to suggest that, in a situation
in which a worker is subject to evaluation and/or discipline for, inter
alia, failing to heed “suggestions” about what music to listen to or
about providing bottled water to passengers, Uber is not retaining “all
necessary control” over its operations. In fact, these examples
arguably push Uber’s micromanagement beyond the level of
85. See Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 327 P.3d 165, 172 (Cal. 2014).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 171.
88. As has been alluded to, the parties’ beliefs and language contained in contracts are not
necessarily dispositive, but consideration of surrounding circumstances in conjunction with the
above evince a compelling case for Uber’s right to terminate.
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necessary control and into the realm of the unnecessary, further
highlighting the point that Uber’s interest in work details meets at least
the required threshold level under California law.
Comparisons to case law underscore this conclusion. The facts
surrounding Uber drivers in part echo Borello itself, where the court
found that the employer’s control over price, crop cultivation,
fertilization, payment, and right to deal with buyers constituted all
necessary control over its sharefarmer employees.89 Similarly, Uber
controls who its drivers are (and what they drive, for that matter),90
determines the fares charged to passengers, and reserves the right to
terminate drivers it deems unsatisfactory. In this sense, there can be
little doubt that Uber controls “all meaningful aspects”91 of the
relationship it maintains with its drivers.
Additionally, language from JKH Enterprises, Inc. v. Department
of Industrial Relations,92 discussed above, is particularly apposite
here, as Uber maintains “necessary control” “by obtaining the clients
in need of the service and providing the workers to conduct it.”93
As mentioned above, Uber contends at least in some contexts that
its means of control are properly characterized as “suggestions” rather
than regulations that Uber actually makes an effort to enforce.94 Even
if this were the case, however, retaining the right to do so firmly
indicates satisfaction of the “right to control” test.
With the right to control element strongly favoring an employeremployee relationship, the inquiry proceeds to Borello’s secondary
indicia.
B. Borello’s Secondary Indicia
While subordinate to the right to control work details, the
secondary Borello factors do provide useful metrics for a deeper
analysis of an alleged employment relationship. In Uber’s case, while
certain factors do support an independent contractor classification, the

89. S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 408 (Cal. 1989).
90. Exhibit 223-15 at 4, O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(No. C-13-3826 EMC) (Uber’s contract with drivers provides, “You agree that you shall maintain
a vehicle that is a model approved by the Company. Any such vehicle shall be no more than ten
(10) model years old, and shall be in good operating condition.”).
91. Borello, 769 P.2d at 408.
92. 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
93. Id. at 579.
94. O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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preponderance of factors, in conjunction with the “right to control,”
do not.
1. Distinct Occupation or Business
Because Uber’s business model is entirely dependent on its
drivers in order to function, it would take a stretch of the imagination
to argue that drivers engage in an occupation that is distinct from
Uber’s. Where, as here, “the work performed by the drivers is wholly
integrated into [the] operation,”95 the businesses are indistinguishable.
To be sure, it should be acknowledged that some drivers do solicit
business from other sources and affiliate themselves with
transportation companies other than Uber,96 which in theory does
support independent contractor status. However, because the services
provided by drivers are such a necessary component of Uber’s
operations, this fact is far more akin to having multiple jobs than it is
to acting as an independent contractor doing business with multiple
distinct entities.
Uber’s argument on this point would likely be to point to its selfcharacterization as a “lead generation” platform, as opposed to a
transportation company, as evidence that its drivers are engaged in a
wholly distinct business.97 While creative, and theoretically plausible,
such distinctions disappear upon closer scrutiny of the reality of the
working relationship between Uber and its drivers.
This factor therefore weighs in favor of employee status.
2. Supervision
As mentioned above, this factor is intimately related to the “right
to control” test, and similar factual elements control both inquiries.
As discussed more extensively above, Uber’s interest in the
activities of its drivers, including its evaluation metrics and monitoring
of ride requests and acceptances, can hardly be described as anything

95. Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 995 (9th Cir. 2014).
96. Notice of Motion and Motion of Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. for Summary
Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 23:27–28, 24:1–2,
O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 13-03826-EMC).
97. Exhibit 223-15 at 3, O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(No. C-13-3826 EMC) (“Raiser (an Uber affiliate) is engaged in the business of providing lead
generation to the Transportation Provider comprised of requests for transportation service made by
individuals using Uber Technologies, Inc.’s mobile application.”).
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other than “supervisory,” notwithstanding the fact that drivers’ duties
do afford an inherent amount of freedom in their execution.
Thus, while there are points to be made on either side regarding
this factor, it more strongly favors an employment relationship when
considered in light of the “right to control” test.98
3. Required Skill
As foreshadowed in Part II, comparisons to case law suggest an
obvious conclusion regarding this factor. As far as the skill required
to drive for Uber is concerned, there is little distinguishing it from any
of the other driving-related positions mentioned in previous cases,
which have overwhelmingly found that these jobs do not require a
high degree of skill. Indeed, some of the positions in those cases,
namely newspaper deliverers and delivery truck drivers, arguably
require more skills than those required to drive for Uber, and yet
employment relationships were found in all instances.99
It may be true that some drivers fare better than others based on
their abilities to maximize their ratings, but such accolades are merely
a result of Uber’s imposition of its own quality control system, rather
than any objective measure, and the fact nevertheless remains that the
only skills truly required to drive for Uber are the same skills required
to drive in California at all—a driver’s license and automobile
insurance.100
Therefore, the lack of particularized skill required of Uber drivers
weighs in favor of employee status.
4. Instrumentalities, Tools, and Place of Work
One of Uber’s strongest arguments lies under this factor, as there
is no denying the fact that drivers do indeed provide the necessary

98. Recall the California Supreme Court’s discussion in Ayala v. Antelope Valley
Newspapers, Inc., 327 P.3d 165, 171 (Cal. 2014), of the non-dispositive nature of a position’s
intrinsic freedom.
99. See Yellow Cab Coop. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 277 Cal. Rptr. 434 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (taxi driver), Antelope Valley Press v. Poizner, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 887 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)
(newspaper deliverer), and JKH Enters., Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 563
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (delivery truck driver).
100. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion for Summary
Judgment at 23:8–9, O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. CV
13-3826-EMC). These circumstances also certainly fall short of providing any “true entrepreneurial
opportunity depending on how well the independents perform their transportation services.” State
Comp. Ins. Fund v. Brown, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 98, 105 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
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equipment in the form of their own vehicles.101 That said, these
circumstances are not substantially different from cases like Air
Couriers,102 discussed above, where, apart from supplying a vehicle,
drivers made no “major investments in equipment or materials.”103
Alternatively, it is worth considering that the Uber application
itself, which is obviously provided by Uber, might constitute a
significant portion of the “instrumentalities” required by the job.
Through this lens, Uber arguably does provide the instrumentalities
needed by drivers to execute their duties, which leans heavily toward
an employment relationship. All things considered, this factor is
difficult to analyze, as there is little guidance in the annals of
California law as to the proper application of this factor to such a novel
business configuration.
In either case, because drivers do provide their own vehicles,
which accounts for at least all of the physical machinery required for
the position, this factor, on balance, weighs in favor of independent
contractor status.
5. Length of Time
This factor strongly favors employee status. Contracts entered
into between drivers and Uber do not contemplate an automatic end
point. Driver contracts provide that they can be terminated by several
means—including material breaches, mutual consent, and extended
inactivity—but do not contain any language indicating a point at
which the agreement will simply cease to be operative, whether due to
a lapse of time or completion of a specific task, as one might expect
from a traditional independent contractor relationship.104
The working relationship between Uber and its drivers also bears
little resemblance, if any, to the more familiar independent contractor
relationship wherein a contractor is hired to perform a specific task for

101. Technically, Uber drivers are provided an illuminated magnet to affix to their vehicles as
a signal to passengers. Such “equipment,” however, is more related to branding and perhaps safety
than anything else, and should not count against Uber in analysis of this factor. Notice of Motion
and Motion of Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. for Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support Thereof at 25:13–15, O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (No. 13-03826EMC).
102. 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
103. Id. at 47.
104. Exhibit 223-15 at 10, O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(No. C-13-3826 EMC).
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a specified amount of time.105 For these reasons, the “length of time”
factor leans heavily toward an employer-employee relationship.
6. Method of Payment
Analysis in this area presents another example of a factor that cuts
in favor of independent contractor status, but may prove to be
inconsequential in the grand scheme. Rather than being paid by the
hour, Uber drivers are generally paid per trip.106 Thus, while this factor
is indicative of independent contractor status, it should be reiterated
that based on case law, such a conclusion is not enough to overcome
independent evidence that an employer maintains the right to control
work details.107
7. Part of the Regular Business
This factor largely overlaps with the first secondary factor
(distinct occupation or business). Accordingly, it weighs heavily in
favor of employee status as well, considering that based on the points
discussed above, Uber’s drivers are literally indispensable to its
operations, and must certainly account for, at minimum, a part of
Uber’s “regular business.”
In this regard, the circumstances here once again bear
resemblance to those in Air Couriers, as Uber also sets rates for rides,
bills passengers, and collects payment.108 As was the case in Air
Couriers, the drivers’ activities here are “integral,” “essential,” and
“part of [Uber’s] regular business.”109
8. Parties’ Beliefs
Case law has shown this factor to be arguably the least probative
of Borello’s secondary indicia.110 Because courts tend to ignore this

105. See Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2010).
106. Interestingly, there is some indication that despite paying drivers by the trip, Uber
advertises possible hourly rates as a means of attracting new applicants. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to
Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 23:17–19, O’Connor v.
Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. CV 13-3826-EMC) (“Uber frequently
advertises or guarantees hourly rates to its drivers.”).
107. See Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 996 (9th Cir. 2014).
108. Air Couriers Int’l v. Emp’t Dev. Dep’t., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37, 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
109. Id.
110. See Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp., 754 F.3d 1093, 1104 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussed above
in Part II), and Alexander, 765 F.3d at 996.
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factor if conduct establishes a different outcome than the one
contemplated by the parties, its analytical value is limited.
For the sake of being thorough, however, it should be noted that
this factor does support an independent contractor relationship. The
contracts signed by drivers explicitly state: “You represent that you
are an independent contractor engaged in the independent business of
providing the transportation services described in this
agreement . . . .”111 Under a heading entitled “Relationship of Parties,”
the contract adds, “[t]he Parties intend this Agreement to create the
relationship of principal and independent contractor and not that of
employer and employee. The Parties are not employees, agents, joint
venturers or partners of each other for any purpose.”112
The contracts between Uber and its drivers thus contain multiple
instances of language professing the drivers’ statuses to be that of
independent contractors, which makes it fair to assume that, at least at
the outset, the parties all believed as such. Therefore, this factor leans
toward an independent contractor relationship.
Consideration of Borello’s secondary indicia reveals that with the
exception of three liberally-construed factors (instrumentalities,
method of payment, and the parties’ beliefs), the analysis comes down
strongly in favor of employee status for Uber drivers, and does little
to alter the similar conclusion reached as a result of the “right to
control” test.
IV. CONCLUSION
Upon thorough evaluation of both the “right to control” element
and the secondary indicia of Borello’s framework, it is clear that in the
eyes of California law, Uber drivers are employees, not independent
contractors. It is true that several of the secondary Borello factors
indicate an independent contractor relationship, but the primary “right
to control” test simply returns a result that is too conclusively in favor
of employee status to overturn. Consequently, a court hearing this
evidence is likely to give credit to these factors supporting Uber’s
independent contractor model, but is unlikely to be able to look past
the glaring conclusion reached through the primary portion of the

111. Exhibit 223-15 at 3, O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (No. C-13-3826 EMC).
112. Id. at 9.
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test—that Uber just retains too much control over its drivers in order
to properly classify them as independent contractors.
This is not to say that Uber’s business model is inherently
unworkable; rather, it is more a matter of Uber needing to manage its
expectations. If Uber wishes to reap the benefits that accompany
classification of its drivers as independent contractors, it should alter
its practices and exercise less control over its employees. In short,
Uber needs to—essentially—treat its drivers like independent
contractors.
In practice, this may prove difficult to accomplish. If, for
example, Uber began by dispensing with its passenger-driver rating
system, thereby lessening its hold over the right to terminate its
drivers, it is difficult to predict what would occur as a result. The status
of drivers would begin to look more like that of independent
contractors, but without a rating system, quality might begin to suffer.
If ensuring high quality, passenger-reviewed customer service was a
primary consideration of Uber’s as it contemplated how it would
establish its business (and there is no reason to believe that it was not),
then altering such fundamental aspects of its company may force Uber
to confront these types of uncomfortable realities.
Regardless of these potentially prohibitive consequences, Uber’s
responsibility, if it wishes to run a business, is to do so in compliance
with established labor law in California; if doing so would indeed
prove prohibitive for Uber, perhaps this is an indication that its success
in revolutionizing the transportation industry, at least under its current
practices, may have merely been a flash in the pan, and that further
industry innovation is required before a permanent shift is able to
occur.
This conclusion should also serve as a useful signpost for new
businesses looking to Uber as a blueprint for their own ventures.
Uber’s business model is that of employer-employee, and emerging
entrepreneurs should not see its success thus far as an invitation to
haphazardly classify employees as independent contractors as a means
of improving their bottom line or making an unprofitable business plan
profitable. In fact, based on the analysis conducted here, Uber is likely
to see a successful challenge waged against its own design.
Accordingly, newcomers to the field should heed this warning and
take pains to ensure that they do not suffer Uber’s anticipated fate as
well.

